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The misidentification syndromes as mindreading disorders
William Hirstein
Elmhurst College, Elmhurst, IL, USA
The patient with Capgras’ syndrome claims that people very familiar to him have
been replaced by impostors. I argue that this disorder is due to the destruction of a
representation that the patient has of the mind of the familiar person. This creates
the appearance of a familiar body and face, but without the familiar personality,
beliefs, and thoughts. The posterior site of damage in Capgras’ is often reported to
be the temporoparietal junction, an area that has a role in the mindreading system,
a connected system of cortical areas that allow us to attribute mental states to
others. Just as the Capgras’ patient claims that that man is not his father, the patient
with asomatognosia claims that his arm is not really his. A similar account applies
here, in that a nearby brain area, the supramarginal gyrus, is damaged. This area
works in concert with the temporoparietal junction and other areas to produce a
large representation of a mind inside a body situated in an environment. Damage to
the mind-representing part of this system (coupled with damage to executive
processes in the prefrontal lobes) causes Capgras’ syndrome, whereas damage to the
body-representing part of this system (also coupled with executive damage) causes
asomatognosia.
Keywords: Capgras’ syndrome; Misidentification; Asomatognosia; Theory of
mind; Mindreading; Executive processes.
INTRODUCTION
Capgras’ syndrome is a misidentification disorder in which people deny the
identities of people close to them, claiming that they have been replaced by
impostors. Patients with anosognosia deny having a disability that they
obviously have, and may even deny that an injured arm or leg is their own, a
condition called asomatognosia (or sometimes somatoparaphrenia). These
are the two oddest members of the family of confabulation syndromes, and
the most difficult to assimilate to what is known about the others.
A comprehensive theory of confabulation that encompasses these syndromes
as well as the others could shed light on some extremely puzzling responses
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to brain injury. Neurologist Todd Feinberg (2001) has proposed a hypothesis
designed to encompass both the misidentification syndromes and asoma-
tognosia, according to which they are disorders of the patient’s sense of
personal relatedness to other people and to his own body. In the subsequent
sections, I will offer an alternative to Feinberg’s view that brings these two
syndromes under the tent of a two-factor hypothesis of confabulation
(Hirstein, 2005). I will start by briefly describing the hypothesis, and
conjoining it with a definition of the term ‘‘confabulation’’. Aside from
showing that these two syndromes fit the suggested definition of ‘‘con-
fabulation’’, and its accompanying two-factor hypothesis, my point in this
paper is that we can understand why people have these strange beliefs if we




In 1787, speaking of confabulatory patients with Korsakoff ’s amnesia, John
Coakley Lettsom (1789) said, ‘‘They talk freely in the intervals of mitigation,
but of things that do not exist; they describe the presence of their friends, as
if they saw realities, and reason tolerably clearly upon false premises.’’ One
year later, speaking of Cotard’s syndrome patients (see later), Charles
Bonnet said, ‘‘They usually draw apparently logical conclusions unfortu-
nately on a completely unsubstantiated premise’’ (cited in Fo¨rstl & Beats,
1992). Both quotations imply a distinction between the ‘‘premises’’ of the
reasoning process and that process itself. Perception and the memory store
supply the premises for cognition, which then operates on them to produce
effective actions. Indeed, one might argue that folk psychology itself, our
everyday way of describing our minds, contains this distinction, since it
applies separate concepts to perception and memory on the one hand (see,
hear, feel, recall) and cognition on the other (think, decide, plan). Maher
(1988) has a modern version of the accounts of Bonnet and Lettsom, arguing
that certain delusions are false beliefs produced by a normal response to
strange experiences. There is a powerful objection to this approach, however:
Why doesn’t the person simply use his ability to reason to reject the strange
experience? We all experience strange thoughts on occasion, the feeling that
someone is watching us; the odd notion that we had a causal influence on
something where no reasonable physical explanation is available (e.g., I flip a
light switch and a car horn honks outside); the idea that others can read our
thoughts. But we are able to reject these, and not let them establish
themselves as beliefs because we have the cognitive processes required to
assess their plausibility. So it seems that in order for such thoughts
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to become beliefs, there needs to be a second problem at the cognitive level.
A two-factor hypothesis of delusions finds its first full explicit form in 2000
(Langdon & Coltheart), followed a year later by a more general version of
the hypothesis (Davies, Coltheart, Langdon, & Breen, 2001). More recently,
Coltheart (2007) describes in greater detail the nature of the executive
problems leading to the failure to reject anomalous beliefs. Those authors
were focusing on delusions, but confabulation and delusion are closely
related, at least in some syndromes, including Capgras’ and asomatognosia.
Confabulation and delusion cannot be entirely equated, since a confabula-
tion is a claim made by person, whereas a delusion is a mental state, typically
thought of as a belief. However, a confabulation can be made on the basis of
a delusion, and this seems to be what happens in the case of Capgras’
syndrome. The patient has the delusion that his father, for example, is an
impostor, then produces a confabulation when he explicitly makes that
claim. Metcalf, Langdon, and Coltheart (2007) broached the idea that a
single, common monitoring framework fails at the second phase in both
confabulation and delusion. Turner and Coltheart (2010 this issue) provide
convincing evidence for this hypothesis.
Contemporary writers attempting to construct a definition of ‘‘confabu-
lation’’ have despaired of the fact that some of the classical syndromes
involve memory disorders (Korsakoff ’s, and a similar syndrome: aneurysm
of the anterior communicating artery), whereas others involve problems of
perception (anosognosia, split-brain syndrome, the misidentification dis-
orders). Since memory and perception are both knowledge domains,
however, perhaps a broader sense of ‘‘confabulation’’ applies to knowledge
itself, or more specifically, to the making of knowledge claims. According to
this approach, to confabulate is to confidently make an ill-grounded (and
hence probably false) claim that one should know, but does not know, is ill-
grounded (Hirstein, 2005). So envisaged, the confabulation syndromes do
form a natural category, which can be further specified. Confabulations are
the result of two different phases of error. The first occurs in one of the
brain’s epistemic systems, either mnemonic or perceptual. This produces an
ill-grounded memory or perception. These malfunctioning perceptual or
mnemonic processes tend to be located in the back half of the brain’s cortex,
in the temporal or parietal lobes. Second, even with plenty of time to assess
the situation and with urging from doctors, therapists, and relatives, the
patient fails to realise that his claim is flawed, due to a malfunction of higher
level brain processes known collectively as executive processes, located in the
prefrontal lobes. Nonconfabulating brains sometimes create flawed percep-
tions or memories, but we are able to correct them, using these executive
processes. If I ask you whether you have ever seen the Eiffel Tower, for
instance, your brain is happy to provide an image of the Tower, even if
you’ve never been near it. But you are able to reject this as a real memory
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because you catch the mistake at the second phase before claiming that you
have seen the Tower. Thus, the typical aetiology of confabulation involves
damage in the posterior of the brain to some perceptual or mnemonic
process, causing the first error stage, coupled with damage to some
prefrontal process, causing the second error stage. The two events of damage
need not occur at the same time; there are numerous cases in the literature in
which patients with an existing site of brain damage began confabulating
after damage to a second site.
If we understand confabulation as an epistemic problem then, the
confabulation syndromes can be categorised as disorders of the brain’s
knowledge domains:
1. Knowledge of the body and its surroundings: anosognosia.
2. Knowledge of recent events involving oneself, i.e., autobiographical
memories: Korsakoff ’s syndrome, anterior communicating artery
syndrome.
3. Knowledge of other people: the misidentification syndromes.
4. Knowledge of our minds: split-brain syndrome.
5. Knowledge derived from visual perception: Anton’s syndrome (denial
of blindness).
Stated in terms of individually testable criteria, the recommended definition
of ‘‘confabulation’’ is: S confabulates (that p) if and only if (Hirstein, 2005):
1. S claims that p.
2. S believes that p.
3. S thought that p is ill-grounded.
4. S does not know that her thought is ill-grounded.
5. S should know that her thought is ill-grounded.
6. S is confident that p.
The concept of claiming (rather than, for instance, saying or asserting) is
broad enough to cover a wide variety of responses, including nonverbal
responses such as drawing or pointing. The second criterion captures the
sincerity of confabulators: They are not lying, and if explicitly asked, ‘‘Do
you believe that p?’’ they will answer affirmatively. The third criterion refers
to the problem that caused the flawed response to be generated in the first
place (the first factor): Processes within the relevant knowledge domain were
not acting optimally. The fourth criterion refers to a cognitive failure at a
second phase (the second factor), the failure to check and reject the flawed
response. The fifth criterion captures a normative element in our concept of
confabulation: If the confabulator’s brain were functioning properly, she
would know that the claim is ill-grounded, and not make it. The claims made
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are about things any normal person would easily get right. This criterion also
prevents the definition from applying too broadly. We do not consider
theologians to be confabulating, for instance, even though their claims
sometimes seem to be made on the basis of little evidence, because we do not
expect people to know the answers to their questions. We do, however, expect
people to know whether they can see, or move their arms, and we expect
them to be able to recognise people they know. The sixth and last criterion
refers to another important characteristic of confabulators routinely
observed in the clinic: the serene certainty they have in their claims, even
in the face of obvious disbelief by their listeners (see Langdon & Bayne, 2010
this issue, who discuss a similar quality of subjective certainty in patients
with delusions). Research from multiple groups indicates that there may be
an additional component at work in at least some cases of confabulation:
The confabulator has a motive to believe that p (Feinberg, 2009;
Fotopoulou, 2009, 2010 this issue; McKay & Kinsbourne, 2010 this issue).
This epistemic approach eliminates a problem endemic to the falsity
criterion in the original; narrower definition of ‘‘confabulation’’, according
to which confabulations are false memory reports (Berlyne, 1972). If a
patient answers correctly, but out of luck, we still consider her to be
confabulating. The problem is not the falsity of the patients’ claims but
rather their ill-groundedness and unreliability, at least in the affected
domain. In shorter form then, in this epistemic view, to confabulate is to
confidently make an ill-grounded claim that one should know, but does not
know, is ill-grounded.
Capgras’ syndrome
Neurological patients with Capgras’ syndrome claim that people close to
them, typically spouses, parents, or children, have been replaced by similar-
looking impostors. When asked how they can tell that the person is an
impostor, Capgras’ patients will often confabulate. One patient claimed that
she could tell her husband had been replaced because the new person tied his
shoelaces differently; another patient said that the impostor of her son ‘‘had
different-colored eyes, was not as big and brawny, and that her real son
would not kiss her’’ (Frazer & Roberts, 1994, p. 557). A blind Capgras’
patient said that the impostor’s hand felt softer than his mother’s (Rojo,
Caballero, Iruela, & Baca, 1991). The patient’s attitude towards the
‘‘impostor’’ can vary. The majority of Capgras’ patients are suspicious of
the ‘‘impostor’’ at the very least. Many are paranoid about the ‘‘impostor’’,
and attribute intent to harm to him, but there are also cases where
the patient’s attitude is positive. Capgras’ syndrome patients will sometimes
even misidentify themselves as seen in photos, or even in a mirror (Hirstein
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& Ramachandran, 1997; Silva & Leong, 1994, review 30 cases of Capgras’
for oneself). Capgras’ syndrome fits the pattern of damage seen in the
memory syndromes: damage to some knowledge system, in this case a
perceptual one, paired with frontal damage (Signer, 1994).
Asomatognosia
‘‘Anosognosia’’ means lack of knowledge, or unawareness, of illness. First
described in detail by Babinski in 1914, this unawareness can accompany
certain types of paralysis caused by damage to the right inferior parietal
cortex, and seems to play a role in causing an intriguing response known as
denial in some patients. When asked about their disabilities, they will calmly
and firmly deny that they are paralysed or weakened. The typical denial
patient, interviewed as he rests in bed after a stroke that has paralysed his
left arm, will claim that both arms are fine. When asked to touch the doctor’s
nose with his left arm the patient will move his torso slightly, then stop.
When asked whether they touched the doctor’s nose, some patients will say
that they did; others will admit that they didn’t but confabulate a reason why,
such as that they are tired, don’t feel like following commands right now,
always had a weak left arm, and so on. Some of these patients will further
deny that their brain injury has hampered or limited them in any way.
Although there is evidence that some anosognosic patients have some
types of somatosensation, typically important higher level somatosensory
areas are damaged. These posterior areas of damage, especially in the
inferior parietal cortex, create the first malfunction needed for confabula-
tion, but until recently no clear pattern of frontal damage had emerged in the
study of anosognosia. In 2005, however, Berti et al. showed that patients who
denied paralysis differed from those with paralysis but no denial in that the
denial patients had additional damage in the frontal portions of a large brain
network involved in the planning of motor actions. These frontal areas are
directly connected to the damaged inferior parietal areas. Apparently, the
frontal areas are capable of monitoring representations of intended actions
generated by posterior areas in the same network. As Berti and her
colleagues say, ‘‘monitoring systems may be implemented within the same
cortical network that is responsible for the primary function that has to be
monitored’’ (p. 488). Davies, Davies, and Coltheart (2005) contains a
sustained defence of a two-factor hypothesis applied to all types of
anosognosia.
Asomatognosia is regarded as a subtype of anosognosia. Patients with
this syndrome will deny ownership of their own limbs. The patient will
typically confabulate that the limb belongs to the doctor, or sometimes to a
spouse or relative. They may claim that the arm ‘‘belongs to a fellow patient
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previously transported by ambulance, or that it had been forgotten in bed by
a previous patient’’ (Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991). Patients tend not to
elaborate these claims into more coherent stories, about how exactly a limb
came to be left in bed, for instance, and they may stop responding and turn
away if pressed further. The arm involved is almost always the left arm, and
asomatognosia also occurs at a high frequency among patients whose right
hemisphere is temporarily anaesthetised. Feinberg and his colleagues tested
12 patients with right hemisphere stroke damage for asomatognosia, by
holding up the patient’s left hand so that it was visible to him and asking,
‘‘What is this?’’ (Feinberg, Haber, & Leeds, 1990). The most common
misidentification was calling the limb ‘‘your [the doctor’s] hand’’, or ‘‘your
arm’’. One patient referred to her limb as ‘‘a breast’’ and a ‘‘deodorant’’.
One patient called it ‘‘my mother-in-law’s’’ hand (Feinberg et al., 1990).
Another patient called his arm a piece of ‘‘dead wood’’ (Weinstein, 1991); yet
another called his ‘‘a piece of dead meat’’ (Critchley, 1974). ‘‘The idea that
the arm is ‘dead’ in some sense, literally or figuratively, is common in
anosognosia’’ according to Feinberg (2006, p. 75). Some patients claim that
their flesh is rotting away (Fine, 2006). As Feinberg notes, asomatognosia
may be regarded as a species of misidentification, in that the patients fail to
acknowledge the true identity of their own arms.
Theories of the crucial neural locus for asomatognosia have focused on
the inferior parietal lobes, particularly on the right side. The inferior parietal
lobes are constituted by two gyri, the supramarginal gyrus (Brodmann’s
Area 40) and the angular gyrus (Brodmann’s Area 39). Nielsen was the first
to argue, in 1938, that the crucial site of damage leading to asomatognosia is
the right supramarginal gyrus or its connections to subcortical areas. The
study mentioned earlier by Feinberg et al. (1990) involving 12 asomatognosic
patients supported this localisation.
THREE HYPOTHESES
In the cases of both Capgras’ syndrome and asomatognosia, something very
close and very familiar, a loved one or a body part, is claimed to be distant
and unfamiliar. Jacques Vie´ (1930) was the first to explicitly mention this
similarity (Feinberg & Roane, 1997). In this section, I will examine three
candidate explanations for the misidentification syndromes and asomatog-
nosia. According to what is known as the affective responsiveness hypothesis
of Capgras’ syndrome, the patient fails to experience the normal affective
reaction to the sight of a familiar person, and this causes him to form the
belief that the person is an impostor. This hypothesis seems to originate with
Capgras’ and Reboul-Lachaux’s seminal article, in which they write, ‘‘the
delusion of doubles is not . . . really a sensory delusion, but rather the
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conclusion of an emotional judgment’’ (1923/1994). Many subsequent
writers have argued that in Capgras’ syndrome there is a disconnection
between the representation of a face and what Ellis and Young refer to as
‘‘the evocation of affective memories’’ (1990, p. 243) (see also Bauer, 1986;
Hirstein & Ramachandran, 1997; Staton, Brumback, & Wilson, 1982). The
patients recognise a face, but do not feel the expected emotions, and
confabulate to explain this: ‘‘When patients find themselves in such a
conflict (that is, receiving some information which indicates the face in front
of them belongs to X, but not receiving confirmation of this), they may
adopt some sort of rationalisation strategy in which the individual before
them is deemed to be an impostor, a dummy, a robot, or whatever extant
technology may suggest’’ (Ellis & Young, 1990, p. 244).
What is the link, however, between the absence of an emotion and the
creation of the impostor story? Why doesn’t the patient merely say that
people seem strange or unfamiliar to him? Stone and Young (1997, p. 344)
add another ingredient, the patient’s prior personality, suggesting that once
the patient loses the normal affective reaction to faces and, ‘‘because of a co-
existing suspicious mood, or maybe a premorbid disposition, the person
arrives at the idea that the source of these strange experiences must lie in a
change in the external world, and the possibility of some kind of a trick,
perhaps involving a substitution presents itself ’’. But why would so many
different patients with different personalities, and different premorbid
dispositions arrive at the same highly unlikely story about the same trick?
It is also hard to see how the affective responsiveness hypothesis could be
applied to asomatognosia (something its authors have not attempted). When
applied to asomatognosia, the affective responsiveness hypothesis would
generate the claim that we normally experience an affective reaction at the
sight of our own arms, then confabulate that the arm is not our own in order
to explain the absence of this reaction, which seems implausible.
The second hypothesis is the personal relatedness hypothesis of Feinberg.
The Capgras’ patient has lost his sense of personal relatedness to his father,
while the asomatognosic has lost his sense of personal relatedness to his arm.
‘‘Asomatognosia can be understood as a Capgras syndrome for the arm in
which the personal relationship with the body part is lost’’ (Feinberg,
DeLuca, Giacino, Roane, & Solms, 2005, p. 103). Feinberg points out an
intriguing asymmetry between Capgras’ and asomatognosia on one hand,
and another misidentification syndrome, Fre´goli’s syndrome. A patient with
this syndrome will claim that a familiar person is capable of manifesting
different physical appearances, so that the patients might complain that a
certain person is following them or spying on them while taking on the
outward appearance of different people. Feinberg observes that both
Capgras’ patients and asomatognosic patients claim that something or
someone personally related to them is unfamiliar and distant, while the
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patient with Fre´goli’s syndrome sees unfamiliar people as familiar, or more
broadly, falsely sees people as being personally related to him. Feinberg
argues that the distinction between seeing something as personally related
and seeing something as distant and foreign allows us to form a taxonomy of
the misidentification disorders and other syndromes. As he puts it, ‘‘the
essential dichotomization of these various disorders is on the basis of an
alteration in personal relatedness or significance’’ (Feinberg & Roane, 1997,
p. 80). Syndromes such as Capgras’ and asomatognosia that involve a
decreased sense of relatedness in the patient ‘‘should be thought of as a
disavowal, estrangement, or alienation from persons, objects, or experi-
ences’’. Syndromes such as Fre´goli’s are on the ‘‘the opposite side of the
spectrum’’ and ‘‘are manifestations of an over-relatedness with persons,
objects, or experiences’’ (Feinberg & Roane, 1997, p. 80).
Feinberg acknowledges, though, that not all patients can be described as
claiming solely under- or over-relatedness to people and things. Some of
them do both at the same time, with the same person. ‘‘Many of the
important misidentifications seen in neurological patients actually represent
a co-occurrence of both Capgras and Fregoli types of misidentifications’’
(1997). Many confabulations by asomatognosics, for example, do not involve
the patient claiming that the arm or person is completely unrelated to him.
One patient of Feinberg’s said that her hands were not hers but her
husband’s, saying that, ‘‘He left them . . . just like he left his clothes’’ (2006,
p. 74). She believes that her hands are not her own, but nevertheless sees
them as having a closeness to her. Because of this third, mixed type, Feinberg
and his colleagues phrase their hypothesis in its final form thus: Syndromes
such as Capgras’, Fre´goli’s, and asomatognosia ‘‘represent either an increase,
a decrease, or simultaneous increase and decrease in the patient’s personal
relatedness to objects, persons, places, or events in the patient’s environ-
ment’’ (Feinberg & Roane 1997, p. 80).
Personal relatedness might be too broad of a concept, however. A very
high percentage of the representations in our brains are of things personally
related to us, for obvious reasons. The entirety of episodic-autobiographical
memory, for instance, contains representations of events personally related
to us. There are many different ways in which we represent things, properties,
and facts that are important to us. In addition to episodic memory, we use
somatotopic maps to represent several different properties of our bodies, and
our semantic memories contain a self-concept that knits together all sorts of
biographical information about us, and is immediately connected to our
concepts of people and things of significance to us. Feinberg also seems to
overlook an important distinction between representing something as
literally me or a part of me, e.g., my arm, and representing something as
very closely related to me, e.g., a spouse. The presence of ‘‘mixed’’ patients,
who show both an increase and a decrease in their senses of personal
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relatedness for an object or person, is also troubling, since it indicates that
the patients do not line up neatly on a single personal relatedness continuum.
One way to respond to these criticisms would be to further specify the types
of personal relatedness involved.
The following hypothesis offers a more specific explanation of Capgras’
syndrome, Fre´goli’s syndrome, asomatognosia, and other disorders of
person and limb recognition that fits the basic two-factor approach. It
provides an alternative account for why these syndromes exhibit the
interesting variations in personal relatedness that Feinberg and his
colleagues observed. Our brains represent people both allocentrically and
egocentrically. Allocentric representations of people are viewpoint-indepen-
dent representations of their external bodily features. Our representations of
peoples’ faces are a paradigmatic example of allocentric representations. One
sign that they are viewpoint - independent is that we can recognise people
from many different angles. Egocentric representations, in contrast, encode
the positions of things and spaces relative to a central ‘‘ego’’. Our
representations of the spaces we inhabit are usually egocentric; they
represent the distance of objects from us, the trajectories of objects with
regard to our location, the possible effects on us of nearby objects, and so
on. Egocentric representations contain an intrinsic point of view, whereas
allocentric representations are viewpoint independent. Egocentric represen-
tations give the ego a privileged place in the representations system, whereas
a person’s allocentric system can represent him as one person among many.
Among the faces we are able to visually recognise is our own, usually seen in
a mirror, but the same allocentric visual recognition processes are used
whether we are looking at ourselves or at our friends.
When I represent you from my perspective, I am representing you
allocentrically. When I represent you from your perspective, by using my
brain’s natural mindreading or simulation functions, I am typically
representing you egocentrically. One type of egocentric representation of
an agent is a (spatial) analogue representation from the unique point of view
of that agent, from inside that agent’s head, of processes and events within
that agent’s body, including that person’s thoughts. We represent people
egocentrically by simulating their current experiences from their points of
view, I suggest. The brain achieves this with an egocentric representation
system that functions to represent a mind situated in a body, which is in turn
situated in an environment, according to the representational hypothesis.
This egocentric representation system is responsible for part of our normal
sense that we are embodied minds, moving about an environment. This
system does not always represent us, however. It has two modes of
functioning that we might call self-mode and other-mode. In self-mode, this
system represents my mind, situated in my body, situated in my environment.
When this system functions in other-mode it represents other people as
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minds situated in bodies situated in environments. In either mode, the system
is egocentric; but different individuals can occupy the ego position of the
system. In self-mode, I am the ego at the centre of this system; in other-
mode, the egocentric system represents or simulates the egocentric system of
a person of interest.
The allocentric system represents people from the outside, including
detailed facial representations, as well as representations of entire bodies, or
characteristic modes of dress or movement. The skin seems to mark the
boundary of what the allocentric system represents, whereas the mental
component of the egocentric system represents events occurring inside the
skin, as experienced from the point of view of that body’s owner. These
egocentric representations involve somatosensory representations, but also
involve our awareness of our conscious perceptions, thoughts and emotions.
Allocentric representations are primarily visual, but also involve auditory
representations, as well as representations generated by other sense
modalities.
REPRESENTATIONS OF MINDS
We read several different features of minds using several different brain
processes, one of which, I suggest, is the egocentric mindreading system
described here. The problem of the misidentification patients on this
hypothesis is due to a failure of their brains to activate the correct egocentric
representation of the person they are looking at. Once we get to know a
person well, we develop an individualised egocentric representation of her
mind. I will argue later that we also possess generic egocentric representa-
tions that can be applied to people we do not yet know well. These generic
representations show themselves in our psychologies as character stereo-
types, the loud obnoxious person, the shy, quiet person, and many more. We
employ our own egocentric representation system in other-mode, or as a
simulation, to understand the actions of other people. This is a variety of
simulation theory (Goldman, 2006) in which an egocentric representation
system is employed as an analogue model of that same system in another
person. The misidentification syndromes can be understood as caused by
damage to the mind-representing part of this large egocentric representation
system. According to this hypothesis, both Capgras’ and Fre´goli’s syn-
dromes are mindreading disorders (Hirstein, 2005), due to failures of one of
our mindreading systems, a set of brain processes we use to understand and
predict the behaviour of others. Capgras’ syndrome occurs when egocentric
representations of a particular person are damaged or inaccessible and are
replaced by other, incorrect representations. One piece of data that is at least
consistent with the claim that malfunction exists in a system that is involved
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in representing both ourselves and others is the cooccurrence in patients of
both self-misidentifications and misidentifications of others (see, e.g.,
Hirstein & Ramachandran, 1997; several of the 30 patients with Capgras’
for self reviewed by Silva & Leong, 1994, also had Capgras’ syndrome
directed at others).
The representational hypothesis takes what the patients say seriously,
unlike the other approaches which dismiss it as a convenient creation. These
hypotheses do not account for why so many patients tell the same story.
There is nothing specific about an absence of affective arousal, or of a sense
of personal relatedness, that would lead someone to posit an impostor. But
the experience of an unfamiliar mind situated within a familiar body, with a
familiar face, is exactly what would lead to assertions about impostors.
According to Feinberg’s hypothesis, the Capgras’ patient experiences a lack
of a sense of personal relatedness, and this causes him to claim that the
person he sees is an impostor. But the patient does not merely see someone
familiar as unfamiliar, he perceives that person as having a different identity.
The patient does not merely treat the ‘‘impostors’’ as less related than they
were before; he treats them as different people. This is because he sees them
as no longer having the same mind, the same motives, moods, and emotions.
For example, paranoid Capgras’ patients attribute evil intentions to the
impostors.
To claim that someone is not in fact your father, but rather some stranger
pretending to be your father, is to make a claim about the identity of that
person, and also to disavow the personal relatedness of that person.
Logically, the identity of someone is independent of that person’s degree
of personal relatedness to us, but in practicality, when the identity of loved
ones is at stake, alterations in perceived identity will also involve alterations
in perceived personal relatedness. Conversely, alterations in the patient’s
sense of personal relatedness need not also involve alternations in perceived
identity. One might experience a loss in the sense of personal relatedness to a
person, yet not doubt the identity of that person, even if that person is one’s
father, so that the person might say, ‘‘Dad seems strangely unfamiliar to
me.’’ Thus, an alteration in one’s sense of personal relatedness alone is not
sufficient to produce a misidentification patient. Similar logic applies to the
affective responsiveness hypothesis. Failing to register a certain affective
response at the sight of a person would not in itself lead one to doubt the
identity of that person. One might rather think something like, ‘‘I don’t love
my mother as much as I used to.’’ If I believe that the person in front of me is
an impostor, however, strongly resembling my mother but with a different
mind and identity, this would certainly lead me to have different affective
responses. Thus, the representational hypothesis is logically prior to the
other two, with greater explanatory power.
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The personal relatedness factor one sees in the misidentification
syndromes may be due to the way that the egocentric system is not merely
egocentric, and typically used to represent ourselves, but used also to
represent people, objects, and events of personal significance. Rather than
explaining the patient’s beliefs by way of a malfunction in her person-
representation systems, Feinberg attributes them partly to affective/motiva-
tional factors. The tendency of patients to cling to the delusional belief,
according to Feinberg, ‘‘suggests that there is an impediment or resistance to
the truth’’ (Feinberg et al., 2005; see also Feinberg, 2009). Feinberg posits
various motivational factors as a way to explain this tenacity, but another
explanation for the patients’ insistence on their beliefs is that they are
experiencing a distinct perception of an unfamiliar person (see also Langdon
& Bayne, 2010 this issue). This perception is coming from a normally
trustworthy source, and the patients lack the ability to critically assess its
groundedness. The idea that affective or motivational factors are doing the
work also does not square with the frequently reported blandness of the
patients. They are not shocked that a foreign arm is attached to their
shoulder, or that impostors keep visiting them in the hospital.
In order to produce an accurate simulation of another person, we need an
extensive and detailed representation. We need to build a complete scale
model of an aeroplane in order to test it in a wind tunnel, for example,
because of the holistic way in which changes in one property of the aeroplane
affect others. If we change the airflow over one part of the plane, we have then
changed the airflow over the parts of the plane behind this part. Similarly, we
need a full model of a minded, embodied person in an environment in order
to perform effective simulations of people in alternative situations. The way
we know what to expect from a person is to create a simulation of him or her.
This simulation should include the person’s emotions. Knowing someone
means knowing what makes her happy and what makes her angry, as well as
how she behaves when she’s angry or happy. Some types of simulations of
minds can be thought of as functions from perceptions to actions. Two
different people will respond differently to the same perceptions. One person
may do what another person merely considers then inhibits, in the same
situation. There are also cases where a perception causes a certain emotion
that in turn causes an action. In order to represent these personalities, these
functions, we would also need to simulate these emotions. We are not
normally aware of our mind-representations as representations because we
simply see ourselves as perceiving people with emotions and personalities and
characters. We do not realise that we are not directly perceiving their
emotions, intentions, or motives; we are reproducing them within ourselves,
usually spontaneously.
One objection here is that the Capgras’ patients tend to mention external
features, not mental features, when asked how they can tell that the person in
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question is an impostor. I suggested earlier that Capgras’ patients’ claims
about how they detect the imposter by slight differences in appearance might
be a kind of confabulation. Breen, Caine, Coltheart, Hendy, and Roberts
(2000) offer a quotation from author Clifford Beers, in which he describes
his experiences after his recovery from the Capgras delusion. When relatives
came to see him, he said, ‘‘I was able to detect some slight difference in look
or gesture or intonation of voice, and this was enough to confirm my belief
that they were impersonators’’ (Beers, 1953, pp. 6263). Beers thought he
detected slight differences, as many patients do, but notice that during the
delusional phase, he regarded these as confirmatory of a preexisting belief
that the person he was looking at was a different person, some stranger who
was ‘‘impersonating’’ his relative. One good example of this is the blind
patient with Capgras’ who said that the impostor’s hand felt softer than his
mother’s (Rojo et al., 1991). It seems improbable that he determined that she
was an impostor by feeling her hand. Rather, he believed she was an
impostor prior to touching her hand, most likely when hearing her voice.
EXECUTIVE PROCESSES
According to the two-factor hypothesis of confabulation, once a person or
limb is misidentified (Factor 1), the brains of the patients fail to employ
executive processes to correct the error (Factor 2). What exactly are
executive processes, though? Cognition requires both representations and
processes for manipulating those representations*these latter are executive
processes. Executive processes perform many different operations on
representations. One clear illustration of executive processes at work
managing representations occurs when we recall some past event from our
lives. Your memory itself is just a huge collection of representations;
executive processes must control the search and reconstruction processes
that take place when we remember. Executive processes also control mental
activity by allowing us to shift our focus from perception to memory or
back, or to rearrange items held in working memory (e.g., in the digit span
task, where a sequence of numbers is read out loud to the subject, who must
then report the sequence in reverse order).
A great deal of what we normally call thinking, deciding, planning, and
remembering is accomplished primarily by the brain’s executive processes.
One introspectively accessible measure of the amount of executive activity is
our sense of mental effort. Increased mental effort correlates with increased
usage of oxygen by executive areas, which is detectable by brain imaging. In
such studies, tasks are devised that require the intervention of executive
functions; brain activity is then monitored as the subject attempts the task.
Most executive processes reside in the prefrontal lobes, including the
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dorsolateral frontal lobes on the side of the brain, the ventrolateral frontal
lobes below them, the medial prefrontal lobes, on the inner surfaces of
the two hemispheres, and the orbitofrontal lobes located on the brain’s
undersurface just above the eye sockets (Moscovitch & Winocur, 2002). One
area that is frequently active during effortful processing is the anterior
cingulate, in the medial prefrontal cortex. The anterior cingulate is thought
to play a role in resolving conflicts between routine actions that are not
relevant to the present task, and novel actions that are relevant. It also
activates strongly when the subject detects an error in his response (Carter,
Botvinick, & Cohen, 1999).
The executive processes can participate in the act of recognition itself, and
they normally have the power to overrule our initial perceptual identifica-
tions. We all experience strange misperceptions at times, but we are able to
correct them using executive processes. I believe I see my friend in a hotel
lobby in Nairobi, but then I realise how improbable that is*this friend never
travels, has no interest in Africa, etc.*so I tell myself that it is just someone
who resembles my friend. The decision must be made at the executive level as
to whether the presence in consciousness of a given representation truly
means that the represented object is there. For example, the existence of
phantom limbs involves an active egocentric representation of the missing
limb, but at the executive level that activity is not taken as a veridical
representation, mainly because the allocentric system strongly confirms the
absence of the limb. Conversely, severing of the nerve to an arm can produce
the impression that the arm is not there, due to the removal of
somatosensation, which is part of the egocentric system. But executive
processes are able to let the continued correctness of the external, allocentric
representations of the arm overrule this impression: The arm is still there,
merely numb, the patient concludes. The executive systems thus have the
ability to let either the allocentric system or the egocentric system win out
over the other, in the event of discord between them. When we first become
aware of a person’s presence, two different streams of processing, one
egocentric and one allocentric, commence their work. In neurological
patients, failure of either the allocentric stream or the egocentric stream,
coupled with the relevant executive failure, should produce a confabulation
if the patient is asked the right question.
PROSOPAGNOSIA, COTARD’S SYNDROME, AND
FRE´GOLI’S SYNDROME
One way to test and further elucidate the representational hypothesis and its
larger two-factor approach is to apply it to other syndromes in which
recognition of persons fail. Neurological patients with prosopagnosia can no
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longer visually recognise the people they know, and their faces do not look
familiar to the patient, but the patients continue to attribute the same
personalities and other mental traits to them once they recognise them,
typically by the sounds of their voices. Prosopagnosics can sometimes
recognise people using specific visual cues, such as a person’s distinctive
nose or ears, or even the type of glasses or tie someone typically wears. For the
prosopagnosic, the familiar face is not present, but the person is; once the
patient hears his mother speak, he recognises her, and will treat her as his
mother. For the Capgras’ patient, the familiar face is present, but the person is
not. The Capgras’ patient’s allocentric system is intact, but his normal
egocentric representation of that person is damaged or inaccessible. The
Capgras’ patient’s relevant executive processes are malfunctioning, and this
prevents him from realising how implausible the impostor claim is and
rejecting it. The typical prosopagnosic does not have executive damage, but
according to the hypothesis described here, a prosopagnosic with executive
damage should confabulate when asked to identify people. The two patients of
Rapcsak, Polster, Comer, and Rubens (1994) seem to fit this profile. They were
both unable to recognise familiar faces, and when asked to identify faces in
photographs, they employed the style typically seen in prosopagnosics of
attempting to identify faces by focusing on distinctive features. The use of this
strategy, together with executive failure, caused the patients to confabulate
that unfamiliar people were familiar, because the unfamiliar person shared
some facial feature with the familiar person. One of the patients pointed to a
fellow patient on the ward, for instance, and exclaimed, ‘‘There’s my father! I’d
recognise that hooked nose anywhere!’’ The authors seem to favour a two-
factor approach, noting that, ‘‘the frontal lobes are also likely to be
responsible for detecting and resolving potential ambiguities arising in
connection with the operations of perceptual recognition systems’’ (Rapscak
et al., 1994, p. 577). They further observe that, ‘‘the dysfunction of the
decision making process in our patients was evidenced by the fact that they
rarely if ever attempted to verify the correctness of their initial impressions
regarding a person’s identity. Instead, they seemed to accept the output
generated by the impaired face recognition system unconditionally.’’ We
might call this syndrome dysexecutive prosopagnosia. It causes misidentifica-
tions based on superficial similarities of facial features that patients lack the
executive processes to correct.
The patient with Cotard’s syndrome says that he is dead, hollow, or
empty. These patients perceive their own body and face well enough, but see
no mind at home there, rather like a dense neurological version of
depersonalisation. Cotard’s original patient said that she had ‘‘no brain,
nerves, chest, or entrails, and was just skin and bone’’ (Berrios & Luque,
1995). One Cotard’s patient described ‘‘feeling nothing inside’’ (Wright,
Young, & Hellawell, 1993); another patient ‘‘felt that her brain was dead’’
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(Young, Leafhead, & Szulecka, 1994). Although strictly speaking, Cotard’s
syndrome is not a misidentification syndrome, since the person is correctly
identified but thought to be dead, an explanation of it can be derived from
the account given here. According to the representational hypothesis,
Cotard’s syndrome is caused by complete destruction of the mind-
representing part of the egocentric representation system. Patients with
Cotard’s and Capgras’ for themselves recognise themselves externally, but
attribute either no mind at all to themselves, and hence speak of themselves
as ‘‘dead’’ or ‘‘robots’’ (Cotard’s), or they perceive themselves to have
strange, unknown minds (Capgras’). Some Capgras’ patients see an
unfamiliar mind behind the face in photos of themselves or even in their
own mirror images, and hence may speak of the persons seen in photos or
mirrors as impostors. The Fre´goli’s syndrome patient sees a certain
significant person as somehow inhabiting several different bodies. According
to the representational hypothesis, what happens in Fre´goli’s syndrome is
that the patient’s egocentric representation of a familiar person is paired with
allocentric representations of unfamiliar faces and bodies. This produces in
the patient the impression of a single familiar person disguising herself as a
succession of strangers.
The crucial posterior damage site for misidentification syndromes (in
addition to prefrontal damage causing executive failures) may be a cortical
area just inferior to the supramarginal gyrus, the temporoparietal junction
(TPJ). Two Cotard’s patients studied by Young and his colleagues (Young
et al. 1994; Young, Robertson, Hellawell, de Pauw, & Pentland, 1992)
had temporoparietal contusions along with bilateral frontal damage. The
Capgras’ patient of Staton et al. (1982, p. 26) showed ‘‘a discrete area of
moderate atrophy deep in the [right] posterior-superior temporal lobe at the
temporo-parietal junction’’. Similarly, a Capgras’ patient seen by Johnson
and Raye (1998) had a right temporoparietal hematoma. A Fre´goli’s patient
described by Feinberg, Eaton, Roane, and Giacino (1999) also had damage
at the temporoparietal junction. The temporoparietal junction has been
found to be active during several ‘‘theory of mind’’ tasks, in which subjects
attempt to understand the actions and motives of others. In a typical task,
the brain of a subject is scanned as she observes people performing certain
actions, or displaying certain emotions. The right TPJ’s activity level was
observed to be high when ‘‘participants read stories that describe a
character’s beliefs but low during stories containing other socially relevant
information’’ (Young & Saxe, 2009). It is also relevant that the right TPJ
activates more strongly when the target person has beliefs that are known by
the subject to be false (Young & Saxe, 2009). Saxe (2006, p. 235) describes
the TPJ as an ‘‘area for representing mental states’’ that responds selectively
to ‘‘the attribution of mental states’’ (Saxe & Wexler, 2005, p. 1391) and
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plays a role in developing an ‘‘integrated impression’’ of people (Saxe &
Wexler, 2005, p. 1396).
There are two gaps in the representational hypothesis which still need
filling, however. First, the findings of Saxe and others concern real-time
attributions of mental states to strangers, whereas at least some of the
misidentification syndromes involve people very well known to the patient.
A second gap is that the mindreading system findings concern real-time,
single events of mental state attribution, whereas I am postulating that these
events are accumulated in a type of memory into a mental representation of
someone’s mind. A first step in meeting this objection is to point out that
there is evidence of a TPJ link to the autobiographical memory system;
Maguire (2001) and Fink et al. (1996) found TPJ activity during a task in
which subjects recalled emotional autobiographical events. There is still a
gap here, though, in that autobiographical memory is about me, whereas
I am postulating that there is a related type of memory centred on significant
other people; i.e., that the ego in the egocentric position of the autobio-
graphical memory system is not always that of the owner of that system.
Recall that the egocentric representation represents not merely a mind,
but a mind housed in a body, which is itself situated in an environment. We
use this system to understand the intentional actions of people in
environments. Saxe notes that the TPJ is also ‘‘selectively recruited for
determining how the spatial relations between two objects would appear
from a character’s point of view versus the subject’s own position’’ (2006,
p. 236). The role in computing perspective differences and the role in
computing mental states may actually involve different but adjacent portions
of the TPJ. Aichhorn, Perner, Kronbichler, Staffen, and Ladurner (2006)
recommend that the TPJ be divided into two areas, arguing that its dorsal
portion is ‘‘responsible for representing perspective differences and making
behavioural predictions’’, whereas its ventral part*along with the medial
prefrontal cortex*is responsible for ‘‘predicting behavioural consequences’’
of another person’s mental states. The egocentric system may well have other
modes, including what we might call an alternative self-mode, which we use
to imagine ourselves in possible scenarios. Blanke and his colleagues found
that one can produce a vivid out-of-body experience involving what they
refer to as an ‘‘abnormal egocentric visuospatial perspective’’ (Blanke et al.,
2005) by electrically stimulating the temporoparietal junction (Blanke &
Arzy, 2005), something that again is consistent with its use to represent not
only our own location in space, but also locations that we are not currently
in. Notice that even though these out-of-body experiences are vivid and
realistic, the person does not actually believe that he is, e.g., flying around
the room. According to the two-factor approach, this is because her
executive processes are intact and are able to overrule the experience. This
predicts, however, that it these experiments were tried on someone with the
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right executive processes damaged, she would actually take the experience to
be veridical. Recent research on what is called the brain’s default network
supports the idea that a single large system functions to represent both
ourselves when navigating through space or imagining ourselves in other
possible situations, as well as functioning to achieve mindreading tasks when
our attention is directed at others, and to achieve autobiographical memory
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007). This would also make sense of the finding by
Mitchell (2008) that the right TPJ is active both when we are attributing
beliefs to others and when we are reorienting our attention to a different
location in space: Normally the TPJ represents our space, but sometimes it
represents the simulated space of a person of interest.
EPISODIC MEMORIES OF OTHERS
A person’s episodic memories are memories of that person from her point of
view. The representations that are stored in episodic memory are egocentric
because they represent events as we experienced them; hence they are also
called autobiographical memories. Autobiographical episodic memories
combine several different subrepresentations including representations of
our bodies moving through different spaces and environments and
representations of the people and objects we have significant interactions
with. We carefully represent each aspect of a particularly significant
interaction, exactly what was said, and in which tone of voice. In addition
to representations of emotions, episodic memories may also contain
representations of other conscious states, such as our thoughts, motives,
and intentions at the time of the event. Hence, a full autobiographical
memory representation is of a person with a conscious mind, moving
through space, interacting with people and objects.
The episodic memory system is also able to aggregate its information into
our existing concepts of important people and things. Once this information
enters the system of concepts it becomes part of the semantic memory
system also, and is then accessible to the process of thinking. Thus, the
episodic memory system can feed the semantic memory system. For
instance, if I travel to Paris, the episodic memories I amass as I see
important sites in the city also add information to my semantic representa-
tion of Paris, the Eiffel Tower, the Arc de Triomphe, etc. All of this infor-
mation tends to be either semantic/conceptual or allocentric in form, but I
suggest that the egocentric realm has its own ability to aggregate its
representations into a full-blown simulation of persons’ minds. As I
accumulate information about someone over the course of many interactions
with her, I also accumulate information about her thoughts, moods, and
emotions, using the egocentric representations system in other-mode. We
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might call such accumulated memories, ‘‘biographical memories’’. They
contain information that is extremely valuable to us, so I suspect that we do
not discard it, but rather carefully organise and maintain it, in the form of
accumulations of simulated mental states that are representations of the
minds of the significant people in our lives. If this is right, our full
representation of a significant person contains an allocentric component
with representations of how he looks and sounds, and an egocentric
representation of his mind, body, and environments from his viewpoint.
Our awareness of the minds of others when the egocentric system is
operating in other-mode seems to be nonexplicit and faint in our minds.
Perhaps this is a reason why distinguishing whether an emotion or a
simulation of a mind is missing (as may happen in Capgras’ syndrome) is
difficult for the patients. One hypothesis for why the activity level of the
egocentric system needs to be low when it is operating in other-mode is that
vivid conscious representation leads to actual external actions, not merely to
represented actions, in much the same way that the dreaming mind
malfunctions during REM sleep disorder, when perceptions that are merely
dreamed cause real actions. Simulations cannot fully and explicitly employ
this representation system without danger of causing real actions, with
potentially disastrous consequences.
If correct, this view implies that we possess representations of specific
individual minds, but surely we also have some ability to understand the
minds of strangers. There is also evidence that we possess a set of generic
mind representations that we can employ with people who we don’t know well
enough yet to have created a mind representation of. It seems obvious that we
create generic representations of significant things. All of my episodic
memories of visits to grocery stores, for instance, organise themselves into
generic memories of certain grocery store types, which I access when I decide
where to go to purchase certain foods, or where to look once I’m in a grocery
store. I employ different accumulations of autobiographical memories if I am
in a huge chain store, a country grocery, or the corner convenience mart. If
the Capgras’ patient has lost his representation of his father’s individual
mind, but uses a generic representation when he now looks at him, this is
precisely what would produce the impression of an impostor*his father’s
body and face, but alloyed with the mind of some other, unfamiliar person.
On this hypothesis, then, when both individual and generic egocentric
representations are unusable, Cotard’s syndrome results. The patient can only
represent himself externally, using the allocentric system, and this causes him
to see himself as empty and without a mind. This can also explain why some
patients, such as that of Wright et al. (1993), alternate between Cotard’s and
Capgras’ syndromes: The patient’s egocentric representations are inaccessi-
ble, while his generic egocentric representations are intermittently on- and
offline, perhaps due to irregular blood flow, or to remapping of the damaged
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neural networks. When they are functioning, the patient has Capgras’
syndrome, when they are not functioning, he has Cotard’s syndrome.
One objection to this account is that it locates the problem in the
misidentification syndromes at too high a level. Misidentification is much
closer to being a lower level perceptual problem than a higher level problem
representing the mind of the target person, according to this objection.
Think of what it would be like, however, if you became convinced that
someone you knew well had been replaced by an impostor. As you see her
coming towards you, you recognise the familiar face, and conclude that it is
your friend. But when she becomes closer and begins to speak to you,
something seems wrong. As you continue to interact with her, it seems to you
that she doesn’t have the same beliefs, thoughts, moods, and preferences of
the person you originally knew. You start to get the impression that this is
actually someone else. If you were a normal person, with intact executive
processes, you would not allow yourself to form this conclusion, however.
You would be much more likely to conclude that your friend has undergone
some sort of change in personality, or even to attribute the problem to
yourself, concluding perhaps that you hadn’t really known her as well as you
thought you did. If this account is true to the phenomenology of Capgras’
syndrome, the problem is not immediately perceptual. It is also important
not to tie Capgras’ too closely to visual perception at least, since as noted
earlier it has been observed in blind people (Dalgalarrondo, Fujisawa, &
Banzato, 2002; Hermanowicz, 2002; Rojo et al., 1991).
ASOMATOGNOSIA AND PHANTOM LIMBS
If Capgras’ syndrome is in one sense the opposite of Fre´goli’s syndrome, then
what is the opposite of asomatognosia? The vast majority of people who
undergo amputation of a limb have a clear sensation that the limb is still
there*a phantom limb. Their experience of the limb seems to be the same as
before. They experience it as being in a certain position, as being hot or cold,
as being in pain, as being paralysed, and sometimes even as moving in
response to their intentions, for instance reaching out to shake hands with
someone (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1998). The asomatognosic’s arm is
there, but it seems to him that it is not; the phantom limb patient’s arm is
not there, but it seems to him that it is. The arms of phantom limb patients
feel the same from the inside, as it were, but obviously do not look the same
on the outside. Asomatognosia is just the opposite: The patient’s limb looks
the same externally but lacks certain internal sensations. There is a great
difference in conviction, of course; the asomatognosic is certain that the arm
is not his arm, whereas the phantom limb patient is able to overrule the vivid
impression of the arm’s presence and acknowledge that his limb is gone.
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If the two-factor hypothesis of confabulation is correct, however, the
difference between the two is that the asomatognosic has damaged
prefrontal processes*processes that should prevent his odd impression
from establishing itself as a belief, and this explains the difference in
conviction. Those cases of asomatognosia in which the patient claims that
his arm is dead may be the bodily analogue of Cotard’s syndrome in the case
of mindreading. In both cases, a complete destruction of the relevant
portions of the egocentric representation system causes the patient to feel
that his arm, or he himself, is empty or dead. There is an asymmetry here,
however: With Capgras’ or Cotard’s syndrome, the representation of the
entire mind is compromised, whereas in asomatognosia, a representation of
only a portion of the body is compromised. This may be due to a difference
in the sort of representations the brain employs. Body representations occur
in the form of somatotopic maps, spread out over cortical areas, so that
damage might affect just a portion of the map. Perhaps mind representations
are in some more holistic form, so that damage to a portion of them affects
the entire representation.
What would a phantom limb patient with compromised executive
processes say about his limb? There is an analogy here with dysexecutive
prosopagnosia in the realm of limbs. Amputee patients with phantom limbs
have not normally also sustained brain damage, but if a person lost a limb
and damaged the relevant frontal processes, would he actually deny that his
limb was gone? The Capgras’ patient DS described in Hirstein and
Ramachandran (1997) was just such a person. His right arm needed to be
amputated, just below the elbow, after a car accident in which he also
sustained serious brain damage. At several points in our interactions with
him, he denied that his arm was gone.
MISIDENTIFICATION AND THE THIRD VISUAL STREAM
In spite of not being able to consciously recognise familiar people,
prosopagnosics will register a larger average skin-conductance response
(SCR) to familiar faces than to unfamiliar faces. Bauer (1984) and Ellis
and Young (1990) suggested that Capgras’ syndrome is the mirror-image
of prosopagnosia, and hypothesised that Capgras’ patients would lack the
normal SCR to familiar faces, and this was later verified in several
patients (Ellis, Young, Quayle, & de Pauw, 1997; Hirstein & Ramachan-
dran, 1997). Prosopagnosics typically show damage to the fusiform gyrus,
on the undersurface of the temporal lobes, so it was generally thought
that damage to this more ventral route destroys the ability to recognise
familiar faces, while some other processing stream was intact, and still
able to produce an SCR to the seen faces. It is not clear where the other
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processing stream is, however. Bauer initially suggested that the SCR
route was in the dorsal cortex, but this seemed implausible given that this
cortex specialises not in face recognition, but in representing the body,
and in coordinating the computations needed for spatial navigation,
reaching for objects, and such tasks.
In 2003, Rizzolatti and Mattelli proposed that the traditional division of
visual streams leaving the occipital lobe into a ventral and a dorsal one
(Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982) is inadequate, and that the dorsal stream of
visual processing should be divided into two separate streams which they call
the dorsodorsal stream, and the ventrodorsal stream. The dorsodorsal
stream has all of the characteristics traditionally attributed to the dorsal
stream: It terminates in the superior parietal lobe and functions to provide
the information required to execute actions involving, e.g., reaching for
nearby objects. The idea of a ventrodorsal stream is a new concept, though,
and that stream has been found to have some interesting characteristics.
Area PF in the rhesus monkey, which corresponds to the supramarginal
gyrus in humans, is the primary recipient area of visual input for this stream.
Area PF is now known to contain mirror neurons, neurons that respond
when the subject executes a particular, e.g., arm action, or when the subject
sees another person execute that same action (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).
In my earlier terminology, PF is able to operate in both self-mode and other-
mode. This raises the intriguing possibility that the recipient areas of the
ventrodorsal stream are the ones damaged in Capgras’ patients, as well as
other misidentification patients.
The mindreading system and the mirror neuron system are different
systems, however, and several writers have pointed out that they are
disjoint (Decety & Lamm, 2006; Jackson & Decety, 2004; Saxe, 2005).
The mindreading system is currently thought to consist of the left and
right TPJ, an area of dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, an area of the
superior temporal sulcus (STS), and a portion of the posterior cingulate
gyrus (Saxe, 2005). The mirror neuron system consists of three cortical
areas, one that corresponds to PF, a portion of the superior temporal
sulcus, and a frontal component, located in the ventral portion of
Brodmann’s Area 6 (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). The STS does not
contain mirror neurons, but does respond to biological motion, i.e.,
movements by living organisms, including human eye movements (Hoff-
man & Haxby, 2000; Puce & Perrett, 2003). Perhaps the superior
temporal sulcus links the mindreading and mirror systems. One would
expect to find such a link, on the hypothesis that we use the mirror
neuron system to understand what action a person is performing, leading
naturally to the use of the mindreading system to understand the beliefs,
motives, and intentions behind the action.
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CONCLUSION
The brain’s right hemisphere appears to contain areas, such as the
supramarginal gyrus and the temporoparietal junction just below it, that
serve the dual function of representing ourselves on certain occasions, and
other people on other occasions. I suggest that areas such as the
supramarginal gyrus and the TPJ, working in concert with interconnected
areas in the temporal and prefrontal lobes, are responsible for the sense
of oneself as an embodied being with a mind situated in an environment.
Out-of-body experiences, for instance, contain representations of what
one’s phenomenology, one’s mental life, would be like, as well the changes
in one’s body and its environment. When we understand the intentional
actions of others, these areas serve as an egocentric representation
of them.
The debates here raise deeper issues about how we represent things and
people, independently of the properties that they have only contingently.
Descartes (1632/1967) famously noted that a ball of wax can change every
one of its properties, its shape, colour, texture, smell, and hardness, when
brought near a flame and melted, and yet we still represent it as the same
thing. Philosophers in the middle ages spoke of things as containing a
sort of core essence that they called a ‘‘haecceity’’, that maintains their
identities despite changes in their properties. Perhaps haecceities or
something like them exist not in things themselves (indeed, where would
they be, and what sort of material existence could they have?) but rather
in our brains. Perhaps the central ‘‘ego’’ in the egocentric system
functions as a sort of haecceity, in that it is tied to the identity of a
specific person (which may vary over time), no matter what the other
parts of the egocentric system represent, while itself having no representa-
tional content.
The account here, if correct, brings the misidentification syndromes and
asomatognosia into line with the rest of the confabulation syndromes by
showing how they also fall under a two-factor hypothesis. Confabulation is
caused by two events: (1) Damage to some perceptual or mnemonic
process in the posterior of the brain, typically the cortex; and (2) damage
to some prefrontal executive process that monitors and can correct the
output of that perceptual or mnemonic process. In the case of asomatog-
nosia, the posterior lesion tends to occur in the inferior parietal lobe, often
in the supramarginal gyrus. The lesion that causes misidentifications of
people seems to be just below that one, in the temporoparietal junction.
We build large, detailed representations of the minds of those close to us,
according to this hypothesis. We create these representations so auto-
matically, and they operate so subtly, that when they are damaged we have
trouble understanding what has happened. Capgras’ patients perceive a
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familiar face and body, but inhabited by an unfamiliar mind. With no
executive processes to resolve the contradiction, the odd impression forms
into a delusional belief which, when expressed, becomes a confabulation
about an impostor.
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